Do migrants send remittances as a way of self-insurance? While this motive is theoretically suggested in the literature, the question of identifying this relationship empirically has only begun to be explored. Using a unique representative survey of immigrants in Greater Dublin, Ireland, we utilise the established link between risk aversion and the purchase of insurance to address the question from a new perspective. We nd a positive and signicant relationship between risk aversion and remittance behaviour. Risk-averse individuals are more likely to send remittances home and are, on average, likely to remit a higher amount, after controlling for a broad range of individual and group characteristics. The results suggest that the self-insurance motive is especially signicant for remittances sent outside the household (as opposed to members in the household) and for migrants from Africa.
Introduction
The scale and growth of global remittance ows over the last decade has been unprecedented. Ocially recorded remittances to developing countries have quadrupled over the last decade from US$ 85 billion in 2000 to US$ 372 billion in 2011 (Ratha and Xu, 2008;  ?), a value three times greater than total ocial development assistance. While this signicant global ow of money has motivated a great deal of research, the reasons behind why people remit are still not fully understood. A myriad of possible motives to remit have been identied in the literature, such as altruism (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Vanwey, 2004) , income smoothing (Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; Yang and Choi, 2007) or maintaining good will with the family back home (Amuedo- Dorantes and Pozo, 2006) . Understanding which motive dominates in any given context is crucial, as policies designed to support remittance ows by origin and host countries can only be eective if the motivation behind these nancial ows is fully understood.
In this paper we investigate whether the desire of migrants to insure against uncertain future wages is a motive to send remittances. There is evidence that networks at home often provide nancial assistance to migrants in case of negative income shocks in the receiving country and that home networks are able to monitor the nancial situation of the migrant through contacts with network members in the receiving country (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; De la Briere et al., 2002; Mazzucato, 2009 Mazzucato, , 2011 . Given that the willingness of network members at home to provide nancial assistance in dicult times is likely to depend on past remittances from the migrant, the decision to remit can be viewed as insurance against future negative shocks. While the self-insurance motive is often mentioned, there are few studies that test this motive empirically, notable exceptions being Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) ; Lucas and Stark (1985) ; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) .
We propose a new approach to empirically address the self-insurance motive 3 , by using the established relationship between individual risk preferences and the purchase of insurance.
Given that more risk-averse individuals have a preference for purchasing more insurance, in the migration context, we would expect these individuals to remit more. Therefore, evidence of a statistically signicant positive link between risk aversion and money sent home would provide supportive evidence for the self-insurance motive.
In order to test the self-insurance hypothesis, we utilise an experimentally validated measure of risk aversion in a representative sample of migrants in the Greater Dublin Area, Ireland. Our data contains a detailed module on remittance behaviour encompassing a variety of channels and methods of sending money and gifts to social network members in the home country. In addition, detailed individual and household information of the migrants in Ireland as well as key characteristics of remittance recipients are available. This unique combination of remittance and risk preference data allows us, for the rst time, to test the self-insurance motive using this approach.
Using our tailored data set, we investigate what impact being risk averse has on both the probability and amount remitted, controlling for a broad range of individual and network characteristics. We nd that there is a statistically signicant positive relationship between being risk averse and both the probability and amount remitted. This result remains signicant after including a wide range of controls found in the literature, and a range of robustness checks. When testing for heterogeneous eects in our model, we nd that the positive link between risk aversion and remittances is especially signicant for individuals from Africa, and for instances where remittances are sent outside the household.
The limited empirical literature that exists on the self-insurance motive to remit has focused on identifying a link between remittance behaviour and the level of income (Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) ; Lucas and Stark (1985) ) or wage uncertainty (Amuedo- Dorantes and Pozo (2006) ) in the host country. In these studies an increase in remittances in response to a rise in the wages of network members at home, or an increase in wage uncertainty for the migrant, is presented as evidence of self-insurance. Where the former suggests that higher wealth of network members increases the potential payo from self-insurance and the latter that higher uncertainty for the migrant increases the benet of insuring against a negative shock. Our approach of looking at risk preferences provides a more direct test of the self-insurance hypothesis and avoids some of the identication issues of the existing literature.
The rest of the article is organised in the following way: section 2, provides a brief overview of the existing literature; section 3 introduces a theoretical framework to clarify the risk preference-self insurance link; section 4 describes the survey design and presents descriptive statistics; section 5 introduces the empirical strategy; sections 6 and 7 present and discuss the results; section 8 concludes.
Existing Literature
This section reviews the existing literature on dierent motives to remit, paying specic attention to the few articles that have focused on the self-insurance motive.
In the course of attempting to understand the motives behind remittances, three dom-inant themes in the literature have been identied: altruism, income smoothing and social control. While most studies in the literature acknowledge that altruism plays at least some role in the decision to remit, some have found it to be the main and overriding motive to send money home (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002) . The altruism motive may be a function of the degree of control that migrants have over the use of remittances, as shown by Ashraf et al. (2012) and in the context of migrants from El Salvador and Mozambique, respectively.
The literature also suggests that altruistic motives for sending remittances are more common for certain groups of recipients than others. A common nding is that remittances sent to the migrant's household members in the sending country are more often motivated by altruism. For example, (Stark and Lucas, 1988) concludes that remittances to family at home are governed by 'mutual altruism' and that more remittances are received from close kin for altruistic purposes in the urban rural context. Vanwey (2004) nds that inter household remittances are motivated by altruism, when money transfers are made to female recipients and to poorer households in Thailand. Outside of the migration literature ,Becker (1981) provides a theoretical framework for why altruism is more likely to occur within family businesses than in the market place.
Closely related to the idea of purely altruistic motives is the motive to send money in response to negative income shocks. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) nd that while income smoothing for the network members in the sending country were not the main motive for remittances to Mexican households, they were able to partly address to problem of stabilising income ows. Using random shock to home network income from rainfall in the Philippines, Yang and Choi (2007) show that the income smoothing motive is important to the remittance decision, Clarke and Wallsten (2003) also nd that remittances can counteract negative home country income shocks from earthquakes in Jamaica.
A further motive for remittances suggested in the literature is the willingness of the migrant to maintain social control over networks at home or the ability of sending country networks to encourage remittances through links with other individuals in the receiving country. Chort et al. (2012) provide evidence that remittances may act as a fee that migrants pay to get access to sending country network services; Sana (2005) nds negative relationship between increases in social status and remittances in Mexico. Also in Mexico, Roberts and Morris (2003) nd that remittances play an important role in maintaining networks in the sending country. Batista and Narciso (2012) corroborate these ndings by presenting experimental evidence that increased information ows between migrants and their networks back home signicantly increases the magnitude of remittances.
The strand of literature most directly related to this paper tries to identify the selfinsurance motive. The self-insurance mechanism has been identied by comparing income variation of the migrant in the home and source country and testing which is related to remittances; or by measuring individual wage risk of migrants directly and estimating the impact of this higher risk on the share of income remitted.
The rst method for testing the insurance motive of remittances involves looking at the sign of the relationship between income in the home country and money sent home. In this literature it is suggested that a positive relationship between income at home and remittances indicates self-insurance, and a negative relationship indicates altruism. The intuition is that migrants will increase the amount remitted if networks at home have a larger value when they are motivated by self-insurance, or alternatively they will increase remittances in response to worsening economic situations in the home country when altruism is the dominant factor.
Testing this theory empirically Lucas and Stark (1985) nd that the insurance motivation dominates while Faini (1994) and Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) conclude that altruism is the main motive.
The alternative way of measuring the self-insurance mechanism is to look at the wage risk of migrants in the receiving country directly. If migrants respond to increases in wage uncertainty in the receiving country by remitting more, this could be evidence of self-insurance against negative shocks for the migrant in the receiving country. While allowing for the possibility of both altruistic and insurance motives Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) nd evidence that Mexican migrants remit more when faced with higher wage uncertainty, and therefore are driven, at least in part, by self-insurance motives. A problem with this approach is the diculty of measuring wage uncertainty precisely. The authors use individual characteristics such as legal status, educational attainment, time in the US, work experience, type of job and industry of employment. It is possible, however, that the duration of migration is planned by migrants before leaving Mexico, and that the higher remittances are a result of the migrant knowing that he will return and not uncertainty regarding his wages. In this context it is dicult to disentangle planned temporary migration from income uncertainty making the proxy measure for wage uncertainty imprecise.
An important assumption of the remittances-as-investment motive is that migrants are risk-averse individuals who, in the face of greater income risk, insure themselves by remitting more (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006, p229 In the context of migration, the probability and scale of remittances sent for self-insurance should be related to individual risk preferences. Given that more risk averse individuals have a higher preference for insurance, a positive relationship between risk aversion and the probability of remitting would provide evidence for a link between sending money home and self-insurance. We allow for the possibility of a variety of motives, including altruism, to drive remittance behaviour. However, our aim is to identify individual and network characteristics where the self-insurance motive is signicant. We develop the theoretical link between risk aversion and the decision to remit in the next section.
Theoretical Framework
We assume that while a variety of reasons to remit exist; the willingness of networks at home to help migrants in dicult times depends on the frequency and amount of remittances sent. In this way remittances act as insurance against potential wage uncertainty.
We present a simple two period model with two states of nature based on (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Selden, 1978) . In the rst period, the migrant knows that in period two he will receive a positive outcome with no loss or a negative outcome where she will incur a loss in the second period. To insure against the possibility of a negative outcome, the migrant has the option of sending remittances home with the expectation that networks in the sending country will reduce the potential loss in the second period. Let (w i ) be the wealth in period (i = 1, 2) (constituted by the wealth at the beginning of the period and an exogenously given income), (y) be the amount remitted with the intention of self-insurance, and L(y) be the loss occurring in the second period with probability (p) (with L (y) ≤ 0) . ( w 2 ) is the risk yielding w 2 − L(y) with probability (p) and (w 2 ) with probability (1 − p).
A risk neutral individual is indierent between facing the risk ( w 2 ) and receiving the certain amount E w 2 = w 2 − pL(y) in the second period. His maximization problem is then the following:
and the optimal level of self-insurance (y n ) is the solution of :
In this unrisky situation, the concavity of functions (u) and (U ) only reects the desire to smooth consumption over time. Consider now the addition of a zero-mean risk z(y) taking value pl(y) and −(1−p)l(y) with probabilities (1−p) and p respectively. This risk is insurable since the value of the outcome depends directly on the amount invested by the migrant in period 1. The problem faced by the migrant is then
In this risky situation, the concavity of (U ) incorporates both attitude towards risk and the desire to smooth consumption. It can be seen as a special case of Kreps-Porteus preferences in which (v = U ). Evaluating the FOC of this problem at optimal eort under risk-neutrality (y n ) shows that the level of remittances that the risk averse agent will send is higher since (U ) is a concave function. Therefore, the theory suggests that relative to risk neutral agents, those more risk averse will select a higher level of insurance.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Background on Survey
This paper uses a tailored representative sample household survey of the immigrant population in the Greater Dublin Area (N = 1,500). The design of the survey questions and data collection strategy where carefully developed in order to ensure that our sample is representative of all migrants residing in the Greater Dublin Area for at least 6 months and no more than 10 years, where not born in Ireland or had Irish nationality, and were not UK nationals. The survey was designed to include a representative proportion of illegal and non-registered migrants. For example, it was made clear to respondents that the data would be anonymous, and not used for any purposes other than academic research. In order to maximize trust, interviewers were chosen from a broad range of countries and backgrounds and received detailed classroom and in-the-eld training, followed up by randomized quality checks. The data collection methodology was based on a random route approach accompanied by detailed and specic rules designed to minimize non-response bias and ensure representativity.
A hypothetical lottery question is used to measure risk preferences in the domain of money. This measure has been used by a number of studies in the literature, 4 and has been validated using real monetary payments (Dohmen et al., 2005) . The survey included a number of questions regarding remittances to encompass all possible channels which could be used to transfer money or gifts to individuals in the sending country. The survey allowed
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for the possibility of money transfers, money handed over in person (in Ireland or in the sending country) and gifts sent or given in person. The survey also included questions on the frequency and amount remitted and the cost of sending money and gifts home.
5 In addition, data on the characteristics of individuals that receive remittances, including age, gender, country of residence and relationship to respondent is available.
The economic context of when the survey was conducted in 2009/2010 is especially relevant for the hypothesis tested in this article. During this time, Ireland was experiencing an economic recession that had an especially negative eect on the employment rates of migrants. This uncertainty in future economic conditions in the country means that the option of self-insurance was especially appealing to some migrants. Indeed, our data show that from our sample of migrants, 73% believed that wages had decreased and 68% believed unemployment had increased in Ireland in the previous 6 months. Other studies conducted in Ireland conrm the dicult job market faced by migrants. Barrett and Kelly (2012) show that immigrant job loss in 2009 was close to 20%, and would be even higher if a signicant number of migrants had not returned to their home countries.
Descriptive Statistics
Our sample is made up of migrants from a broad range of countries. The three most popular origin countries are Nigeria, Poland and India. All other country groups consist of less than 5% of the sample. Other European Union 'New Member States' are also represented, with the largest groups being Romanians, Lithuanians, and Latvians. The two largest migrant groups in Greater Dublin by world Region of Birth are Africa and Asia. This variety in source countries is relevant for our research question as remittance motives are likely to 5 For more detailed information regarding the remittance module see Batista and Narciso (2012) dier between regions of the world.
Our measure of willingness to take risks is based on a hypothetical lottery question as shown in Figure 1 . The results from the question range from 0 corresponding to no investment to 10, corresponding to investing all of the 100,000 Euros in a risky lottery. Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses to the hypothetical lottery question. According to Figure 2 , the most common answer to the hypothetical lottery question was not to gamble any of the money, while the other responses approximate a normal distribution.
From our sample of migrants 36% sent money home at least once in the year preceding the interview. From those that did send money home the amount varied signicantly as shown in Figure 3 . ranging from EUR 3 to EUR 10,000.
Regarding the relationship between risk aversion and the probability of remitting, simple comparison of averages for the total sample shows that a larger proportion of risk averse individuals send remittances compared to risk loving individuals. Table 2 shows that while only 27% of risk loving individuals sent remittances, 40% of risk averse migrants sent money to networks in the source country. There is also substantial variety in the probability of remitting between world regions of birth. As shown in Table 1 , migrants from Africa are the most likely to remit with 40% sending some money home, migrants from Asia are second most likely to remit with 36%. While 31% of EU New Member State migrants remit money home, only 7% of pre-2004 enlargement EU states send remittances home.
Empirical Methodology
We investigate the relationship between risk aversion and remittances at the extensive and intensive margins, while controlling for a range of characteristics. Stated most simply the equation of interest is:
We are also interested if the relationship between risk aversion and remittances is sensitive to the characteristics of the recipients and the country of birth of the migrant.
Starting with the extensive margin, we estimate a probit model with the binary variable of sending any remittances as the dependent variable and risk aversion, together with a broad range of explanatory variables found in the literature, as independent variables. We also include interaction dummies for risk preferences and remittance recipients and region of birth, as these are the most likely sources of heterogeneity in terms or remittance motives.
We use the probit specication :
where Y i is a binary variable, where 1 denotes any remittances being sent to the home country in the last year; x i1 is the coecient for the risk measure and x i1 x i2 is the interaction eect. In our rst interaction specication x i2 is a dummy variable for the recipient of remittances and for subsequent specications it is the migrants region of birth; X i is a vector of control variables, including individual characteristics, region of origin dummies, occupation dummies, and a number of variables that could explain remittance behaviour.
For a full list of variables and descriptions please see Table ? ?
not sent any remittances in the last year. There are a number of alternative solutions to the issue of zero censoring in remittance data. Bettin et al. (2012) suggests double hurdle and heckit models to account for the possibility of dierent mechanisms inuencing the decision to remit and the amount to be remitted. While this has the advantage of accounting for non-remittance due to budgetary constraints, this type of model can be sensitive to identication exclusions. This is especially a problem for data on remittances, as nding realistic variables that aect the decision to remit money, but not the amount, are dicult to conceive of (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). Therefore, we opt for the tobit model, which accounts for the zero censoring without the identication issues of the selection models.
More specically our econometric specication is:
where the coecients of the independent variables correspond to the probit model outlined above, and the dependent variable is the zero censored amount remitted in Euros in the last year. We also investigate the signicance of the interactions of risk aversion and the recipient of remittances as well as risk aversion and region of birth, as in the probit model.
Results
Estimating the model in Equation (4) allows us to understand the relation between the willingness to send remittances and individual risk preferences. Table 3 presents least squares results showing the relationship between remitting any amount (dummy variable for sending remittances at least once in the last year) and our variable of interest, risk aversion. Column
(1) in Table 3 shows that without any controls, there is a statistically signicant negative relationship between our risk measure and the probability of remitting. The OLS coecient suggests that a one point increase in an individual's willingness to take risks corresponds to a 1.6% decrease in the probability of sending remittances home. This magnitude is signicant considering our scale, as it suggests that moving from the most risk averse individual (with a score of 0) to the most risk loving (with a score of 10) corresponds to a 16% decrease in the probability of sending remittances 6 .
The risk measure remains signicant after including a variety of controls, as shown in Columns (2) to (4) in Table 3 . Comparing Columns (1) to (3) in Table 3 shows that the risk measure remains signicant after adding the controls. More specically, Column (2) includes basic individual level characteristics such as income, gender, education and family status. Column 3 adds region of birth dummies, whereas Column (4) includes industry where migrant works; religion; intended length of stay; year of arrival; nationality and residence of partner; and the percentage of migrants living in the same area as the respondent that have the same nationality (enclave variable) . Irrespective of the specication, the magnitude 6 Following the theoretical discussion in Section 5, the sample should be only made up of individuals earning an income. Around 10% of individuals in our data do not recieve an income. In order to see if the non-earners are inuencing the results we include regressions results excluding non-earners in the Apendix, Tables 12 and11. The results are not signicantly aected by excluding non-wage earners from our sample of the coecient on the risk measure does not change much in terms the size and remains strongly statistically signicant.
The control variables are of interest in their own right as they give an impression of how dierent factors inuence remittance behaviour. Column (4) in Table 3 shows that the following variables are signicant: risk preferences, monthly income, being married, having children, age, education, dummy variable for Africa, Asia and EU as world regions of birth, being a christian, partner being the same nationality as the migrant, intention to stay longer than ten years, and year of arrival. Looking rst at the variables which reduce the probability of remitting, we can see that being married, having children, education, intention to remain long term, and year of arrival all reduce the probability of sending remittances home. Being married to someone living in Ireland and intention to stay for the long term could reect a strong link to the host country, with a higher level of investment in Ireland reecting fewer close network members at home and decreasing importance of home networks. Education appears to have a non-linear eect with individuals with only primary education remitting less, but also additional years of education having a negative impact. This could partly be due to students in the sample, as they are more likely to have higher levels of education but not necessarily have the means to send remittances. The strongest positive eect, in terms of magnitude, on the probability of remitting is the dummy variable for being born in Africa. The OLS coecient suggests that individuals from Africa are 21% more likely to remit after controlling for the other factors (as can be seen in Column (4) in Table 3 ) a result signicant at the 1% level. Other signicant positive eects include; income, age, dummy for being born in Asia and EU-12 countries, partner being the same nationality and being a Christian. The income and age variables could reect increased family budgets that could make remittances more aordable; having a partner of the same nationality could relate to stronger links to the home country that would be lower if the partner was a dierent nationality to the respondent. The signicance of the regional dummies clearly shows that remittance behaviour is culturally sensitive and depends on the country of origin.
We include marginal eects probit results in Table 4 using the same specications as in Table 3 for comparison with the OLS results. The results of the OLS and marginal eects are very similar to the Probit estimation. The risk measure, our coecient of interest, is negative with a value in the range between 16% and 23% as in the OLS specication. Looking at the control variables of the probit specication in Table 4 , the results also closely match those of the OLS specication with the same variables being signicant and having the same signs
and marginal values not signicantly dierent from the OLS coecients. Therefore, we can say that the results are not sensitive to the choice of OLS or probit model and there is a signicant positive relationship between risk aversion and the probability to remit.
In Table 5 we investigate the heterogeneity of eects across remittance recipient groups.
Again both OLS and probit marginal eects are provided. The risk variable is interacted with the dummy variable for sending remittances outside the household (Column 1) and within the household (Column 2). We dene the household living in the home country as being the spouse/partner, parent or child of the respondent. Column (1) in Table 5 shows the least squares results with the 'Within Household' dummy being interacted with the risk measure. Column (1) of (4) in Table 5 show the results of the probit model for comparison and demonstrate that the results are not inuenced signicantly by choice of probit or OLS model. For the probit specication, the within household interaction remains insignicant and the magnitude of the outside household interaction coecient increases to 5 %, while remaining signicant.
The results of the interaction terms support our theory that the link between risk preferences and remittances is due to the self-insurance motive. Furthermore, the data suggests remittances sent outside the household are more likely to be motivated by the self-insurance motive, whereas remittances sent within the household are not linked to risk preferences in the same way, perhaps because the main motive for these transactions is altruistic.
In Table 6 we look at the importance of the world region of birth on the link between risk aversion and the probability to remit. Column (1) in Table 6 suggests that the link between risk preferences and remittance behaviour is most signicant for migrants from Africa. The interaction dummy 'being born in Africa and willingness to take risk' is signicant at the 1% level in the OLS column without further controls, as shown in Column (1) in Table 6 . The coecient suggests that for African migrants one point increase in the risk measure scale is associated with a 3.8 % increase in the probability of remitting. The other region dummies when interacted with the risk measure are not signicant. The coecient remains signicant and the magnitude similar after all of the controls are added, as shown in Column (2) in Table 6 . The probit specication in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 6 show again that the results are not sensitive to whether an OLS estimation method or probit model is used.
As well as the probability of remitting, the relationship between risk preferences and the amount remitted is also of interest. Columns (1) an (2) in Table 7 show the Tobit results indicating that, as well as being less likely to remit, risk loving individuals remit less in total. The results suggest that an increase in the willingness to take risks by one unit would result in a decrease of EUR 105 (before controls) and EUR 120 (with controls) sent home in remittances in the preceding year. The result is signicant at the 5% level (at the 1% level when controls are included). This suggests that more risk loving individuals are less likely to send any remittances home and the amount they send is likely to be signicantly lower.
We are also interested in the dierence in this relationship when remittances are sent within the household compared to outside the household. We allow for the possibility that remittances to dierent individuals are sent for dierent motives. Specically, we expect that money sent within the household is more likely to be motivated by altruism and not self-insurance. Column (1) of 8 shows the results for the regressions when the 'outside household' dummy is interacted with the risk measure. The result in Column (2) suggests that less risk loving individuals are likely to remit less to individuals outside the household.
Or alternatively, that more risk averse individuals are likely to remit more to individuals outside the household. A one point increase in the willingness to take risks decreases the average amount remitted by EUR 157, a result signicant at the 1% level. Column (2) in Table 8 suggests that the interaction eects for sending remittances within the household is positive. This suggests that the insurance motive is not driving remittances ows to family members as for this to be the case we would expect a negative coecient.
Turning to the intensive margin with regional interactions eects, Table 9 shows that the risk measure interacted with Africa as region of origin, is highly signicant (1% level) while interactions with other regions are not signicant. The results in Table 9 suggests that for African individuals, being one point more risk loving corresponds to remitting between EUR 6.1
Alternative Test for Self-Insurance Hypothesis: Employment Status of Network Members20 192 and EUR 261 less in the previous year, depending on the specication. This supports the results on the probability of remitting and suggests that the relationship between risk preferences and remittance behaviour is most pronounced for individuals born in Africa.
Alternative Test for Self-Insurance Hypothesis: Employment Status of Network Members
As well as the relationship of the remittance recipient to the migrant, the nancial situation of the home network also plays a role in the decision to send money home as a method of insurance. Migrants wanting to self-insurance via remittances do so with the expectation of receiving nancial assistance from home network members in case of a negative outcome in the future, making the nancial situation of contacts at home an important consideration.
Sending remittances will only function as an insurance mechanism if the migrant believes that the network member at home is in a position to provide nancial assistance when required.
Therefore, the self-insurance motive is likely to dominate when home network members have more resources, while altruism usually dominates when networks are less nancially stable.
We test this hypothesis by utilising information on the employment status of network members. In our sample 67% of network members are currently employed and we would expect the self-insurance motive to be stronger for migrants sending remittances to this group compared to those with network members not working. Table 10 shows probit results looking at the relationship between employment status of networks and the probability of remitting, broken down by risk preferences of migrants. Column (1) in Table 10 shows that risk-averse migrants are more likely to remit to network members that are currently employed, where as Column (2) in Table 10 shows that for risk-loving individuals there is no statistically signicant link between employment status and the probability of remitting. The statistically signicant relationship for risk-averse individuals and the insignicant relationship for risk-loving individuals remains after including a wide range of controls. The results suggest that risk-averse individuals are 10% more likely to send remittances to network members that are employed compared to those that are not working, where as the relationship for risk-loving individuals is not statistically signicant.
Assuming that risk-averse individuals have a higher preference for insurance than risk loving ones, the results conrm our expectations that the employment status of networks is more relevant for those that remit to insure themselves than for individuals remitting for other motives.
Discussion of Results
Our results suggest that there is a negative link between willingness to take risks and remittances, or alternatively stated a positive relationship between risk aversion and remittances. Given that we control for individual income and other key characteristics this measure is a good proxy for the inherent risk preference of individuals in the domain of money. This type of risk measure has been validated using real monetary incentives for the German Socioeconomic panel study by Dohmen et al. (2005) , therefore we can be condent that the question is able to capture actual risk attitudes of the individuals in our survey.
These results provide evidence to support the existence of the self-insurance motive for remittances. The self-insurance motive is inherently dicult to identify as it is an informal channel and could be combined with other remittance motives. While we cannot explicitly test that the remittance-risk relationship equates to the self-insurance motive, our results do correspond to ndings from smaller qualitative studies. That the results for African migrants are more signicant than for migrants from other regions matches the qualitative studies which have shown that in certain African countries networks of individuals at home have detailed knowledge of the earnings of migrants and that remittances are important for maintaining support from network members in the sending country (Agarwal and Horowitz, 2002; De la Briere et al., 2002) . This increased interest and knowledge by the home network about the nancial situation of migrants would provide an extra intensive to send money to the home country in order to ensure that good will is maintained and that connections at home can be relied upon to help in case of nancial hardship. Furthermore, the fact that the insurance motive was found only for outside the household transfers, and not within the household transfers could be due to the dominance of the altruism motive in transfers to close family. The fact that altruistic motives dominate more in within household transfers has been supported the existing literature (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006; Vanwey, 2004; Stark and Lucas, 1988) .
Conclusions
The relationship between risk aversion and remittance behaviour was tested using a representative household survey of the migrant population in Greater Dublin, Ireland. We nd a statistically signicant positive relationship between risk aversion and both the probability and amount remitted. Looking at specic groups within our sample we nd that African migrants are more sensitive to the relationship between risk aversion and remittance behaviour. In addition, remittances sent outside the household are more likely to have a signicant negative relationship to individual willingness to take risks. This relationship remains signicant under dierent specications. The results suggests that a one point increase in the willingness to take risks scale decreases the probability of remitting by between 1.6 and 2.2 percentage points and the amount remitted by between EUR 105 and EUR 120 per year.
The results support the theory that the self-insurance motive explains remittance behaviour in certain cases. The results also suggest that remittances by African migrants are more sensitive to risk preferences than individuals from other world regions. Furthermore, while remittances sent outside the household are sensitive to risk preferences, those sent within the household do not exhibit the signicant negative relationship which would suggest a self-insurance motive. This suggests that the while remittances sent outside the household are guided by the self-insurance motive, money sent to other household members is not, perhaps because altruistic motives are dominant in these cases.
There is an emerging empirical literature investigating the self-insurance motive for remittances and this article provides an innovative approach to investigating this question.
The signicant and positive link between risk aversion and remittance behaviour provides strong evidence that self-insurance is an important motivation for remittance behaviour and Imagine that you had won 100,000 Euros in the lottery.
Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer from a reputable bank, the conditions of which are as follows: -There is the chance to double the money within two years. -It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested within two years.
You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer.
L014:
What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Nothing, I would decline the offer 0 Table shows the density distribution of remittances sent in the last year by migrants in Euros.
The graph represents the 36% of respondents that sent at least some remittances in the previous year. 
Risk Loving 27
Note: The Table shows the percentage of individuals that have sent money or goods home at least once in the last year. 'Risk Averse' refers to individuals choosing to invest less than EUR 20,000 in the hypothetical lottery, 'Risk Loving' refers to individuals choosing to invest more than EUR 20,000 in the hypothetical lottery. The standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by country of birth. Table 6 , with the addition of three variables. 'EU12*risk' is an interactive term for the recipient being from an EU New Member State, 'Africa*Risk' is the interaction term of being from Africa and the risk measure. 'Asia*Risk' is the interaction term of being from Asia and the risk measure. The standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by country of birth. willingness to take risks. 'School' refers to years of schooling, 'College' is a dummy for college being the highest level of education, 'Primary' is a dummy for primary school being the highest level of education.
'EU12_risk' is an interactive term for the recipient being from an EU New Member State, 'africa_risk' is the interaction term of being from africa and the risk measure. 'asia_risk' is the interaction term of being from Asia and the risk measure. The standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by country of birth. which is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the main recipient of remittances is currently employed and 0 otherwise (67% of network members in our sample are employed). Columns 1 and 3 include just the risk averse sample of respondents (dened as individuals that scored less than 5 on the hypothetical lottery question); Columns 2 and 4 include just the risk loving sample of respondents (dened as individuals that scored 5 or more on the hypothetical lottery question). We use the same controls as in Tables 3 and 4 , and group them in the same categories as in Tables 5 to 9 . The standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered by country of birth. 
